Reflections on the Death of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
By Gary Sick
Gary Sick was deputy director for International Affairs at the Foundation and served on the National Security Council under presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. This article was written originally for his blog, garysick.tumblr.com
Based on my own observations over the years, here are a few comments that seem worth adding to the flood of commentary following the death in January of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president of Iran. First, Rafsanjani was truly a pragmatist. He seemed to believe genuinely that Iran’s revolutionary system would survive only if it engaged with the outside world. There was never any doubt about his devotion to the system that he had done so much to shape. But he was willing to go beyond stale dogma in pursuit of rescuing a system that he recognized was performing very badly.
He was a businessman, and his solutions always seemed to involve deal making. His attempt to bring in the United States and others involved making them an offer they could not refuse. Hence the Conoco offer, or the trade of hostages for President Bush’s “good will”. However, the U.S. always found it could refuse the offer whenever the time came to pay up. It was one of his great disappointments.
People in the west tended to see him as a reformer, and that seems to have been correct at least in his later years. But he liked to let others lead the charge while he stayed back out of the limelight to push the levers. This was not a lack of courage, in my view, but rather an accurate appreciation of his own strengths and weaknesses.
As a consequence, he won the smaller battles but lost the war. When he finally came out to do battle on his own he was repeatedly defeated, even humiliated. His loss to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 was a catastrophe.
Over the past eight or ten years, despite his undeniable presence, he was unable to win the election for Mir-Hussein Moussavi and Mehdi Karrubi. He was not able to keep them out of house arrest. In fact, he was not able to keep even his own children out of jail.
The strategic voting of the 2013 election was clever and classic Rafsanjani tactics. But I would argue that Rafsanjani has had very little impact on policy, even after the election of Hassan Rouhani. He favored the nuclear deal with the west, but the reason it was adopted was because Ali Khamenei supported it, regardless of his body language. Rafsanjani had become a back bencher—an important commentator but not a policymaker.
Contrary to some of my colleagues, my guess is that Rafsanjani’s departure will have very little actual impact on the course of developments from here. If I were in Rouhani’s shoes, I would certainly be sorry to lose an ally with such sterling revolutionary credentials. After all, the centrists need all the friends they can get.
However, the outcome of the next election will depend on Rouhani’s ability to persuade Iranians that they are better off with the nuclear agreement and that he is capable of defending Iran’s interests better than any alternative choice. Having Rafsanjani behind him would no doubt have had its appeal, but Rouhani would have been foolish to depend on Rafsanjani to win that battle.
One should always be cautious talking about legacies so close to the event. Rafsanjani will without question be seen as one of the towering figures of the revolutionary era. His place in history, however, will depend very much on the fate of the very system that he helped put in place but then came to criticize for its anemic performance, and especially its self-destructive rivalries, corruption and discord.
He wanted to cure those problems, and he failed. RIP